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Abstract 
In 2007 the European Commission finalised its proposals for replacing the Television without Frontiers 
Directive.  The resultant Audiovisual Media Services Directive aims to provide a more suitable regulatory 
framework for the creative industries allowing it to benefit from the opportunities brought about by 
convergence.  Convergence is the coming together of different technologies which have distinct functions to 
create one medium which performs each divergent function.  The prime illustration of convergent 
technologies is arguably the coming together of telecommunications and broadcasting, through the internet 
and digital technology, so as to enable us to make voice telephony calls and watch television while sat at a 
computer.  However, while convergence has created opportunities for the industry it has also created threats in 
that the same technology, namely the internet, is also being used to infringe the copyright of content producers 
on a far greater scale.  Wide scale infringement will have a negative impact on the creation of new works; 
without protection from illegal copying the work will have less economic value.  The substantive provisions 
of the Directive focus on regulatory issues such as advertising restrictions and encouraging media pluralism 
and have received criticism from within the industry.  However, it is argued that regardless of any other 
potential flaws the new Directive may have (which are beyond the scope of the present discussion); the 
biggest weakness is not addressing the link between converged media platforms and the potential for 
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increased copyright infringement.  This omission on the part of the Directive may be explained by the 
presence of the Copyright Directive, but this is dependent on the Copyright Directive being adequate for the 
new media age.  This work evaluates whether the traditional approach to copyright protection is still the most 
suitable and whether in fact the arguments advanced in favour of this approach still have merit in the 
converged age.  To this end an evaluation of a creative commons approach is provided in order to see whether 
this may have more advantages. 
Key words: convergence, audiovisual media, copyright, commons 
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The future of copyright in the age of convergence: Is a new approach needed for the new 
media world?
1
 
 
The need for Audiovisual Content Copyright Protection 
Phonographic Performance Ltd UK has described the creative industries as “the key to prosperity in modern 
economies.”2  As a body that works on behalf of performers and record companies, this statement could be 
dismissed as mere industry self-hype.  However, official statistics would indicate them to be correct.  In 2004 
the industry contributed over £56 billion to the UK economy; growing at an average rate of 5% per year 
between 1997 and 2004.
3
  To put this into some context; the average growth for the UK economy as a whole 
was only 3%.
4
  As a sector the exact employment figure “is not entirely clear” but is between 1.15 and 2 
million.
5
   These figures will surely increase as greater access to higher quality content is allowed due to the 
continued expansion of converged technologies, such as the mounting ability to watch television on mobile 
phones, and also as technology develops to allow better quality images to be created and shown.  Therefore, 
the government argues “it is vital that creative businesses are fully able to exploit the exciting new media 
technology that has opened up access to creative content.  However, for businesses to be able to make returns 
on their creativity and invest in new talent and innovation, it is also important that they have the necessary 
protection.”6  In other words, the creative content industry which provides work for the new audiovisual 
media services is held up as a prime example of the traditional economic justifications for imposing strict 
copyright protection.  The argument is that investment in design and development will not be forthcoming 
without the incentive that protection provides.  As Bainbridge suggests, “[w]hy spend large sums of money to 
develop [content] that could be copied freely without recompense?”7    
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Threats and Opportunities for Audiovisual Media in the Converged Environment    
The new environment in which audiovisual media service providers find themselves operating offers 
potentially huge benefits but also creates threats to their business viability.   Converged technologies, such as 
internet protocol television (herein IPTV), offer the chance to distribute content at lower costs, to wider 
audiences and so they are appealing business models.  However, converged media platforms, be it IPTV or 
mobile phone television, need high quality content to drive uptake.  The increased competition for audience 
share between traditional broadcasters has also driven demand for higher quality content.  This has led Patrick 
Bradley of Ingenious Media to declare that “content is king” in today‟s audiovisual environment.8  Thus, the 
opportunity exists for content creators to gain increased exposure through a variety of outlets that now exist 
for their work.
9
  This could, if the quality is sufficient, lead to increased revenue to pay for further innovation.  
Additionally, the Internet allows them to miss out „the middle man‟ and sell their content directly to viewers 
and further increase revenues; even content providers such as Sky
10
 can benefit from the increased content 
production that arises from this demand.
 11
  Content can also be used to attract business for any 
complementary on-demand services being offered by the broadcaster. 
However, despite these opportunities for increased exposure and driving revenue, the same technology 
that allows viewers greater access to content is also a threat.  Digital technology allows for a better quality 
copy of content to be produced and ensures that the quality does not diminish through repeated use.  Internet 
peer-to-peer networks and technologies, such as BitTorrent, allow for the fast and efficient up/downloading of 
large files such as films and TV programmes.  This, in turn, provides for easier distribution amongst 
individuals.  As the content being distributed is of good quality, durable, quick to download in order to view, 
and either free or low cost, more people are utilising the opportunity that the technology brings and not 
purchasing the content through traditional outlets.  This activity is a major threat to the industry as it reduces 
the commercial exploitation potential of content creators and providers.  To take Sky, if „24‟ is freely 
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available in good quality on the internet, for no cost, then there is no incentive to pay a monthly subscription 
to the company.  This threat has led to the observation that “IPTV platforms will only succeed if companies 
can differentiate from the three other delivery platforms – terrestrial, cable and satellite.  They need 
[intellectual property] rights.  If those rights are secured, current TV broadcast models – and the EC‟s 
proposals – will become irrelevant.”12  
Notwithstanding the illegal copying and distribution of audiovisual content, on-demand services are 
themselves a problem.  The purpose of on-demand is to allow viewers to legally download a particular piece 
of content using the Internet.  However, the Internet is obviously global and any website in the world is 
accessible to any person wherever they may be.  Initially this may not appear to be a problem; surely this is a 
benefit that the Internet can provide a wider audience for content?  This may be so, but the flipside is that a 
person, in for example Germany, should be able to go on the website of a UK content producer and download 
that content after it has been transmitted in the UK.  The issue is that this could be before that piece of content 
will have been shown in Germany, most likely under an exclusive distribution agreement between the original 
company and the German company providing the retransmission.  Such exclusive right agreements can be 
extremely lucrative for the purchaser, by either helping to drive subscriptions or through generating higher 
value sponsorships or traditional advertisement spots.  This is obviously in addition to the party selling the 
rights who can generate significant revenues.
13
  On-demand, with the global nature of the Internet, potentially 
makes such agreements worthless.  This dilemma is resolved by preventing access to on-demand services 
from foreign IP addresses, which is the situation with both the BBC‟s and ITV‟s on-demand services.  This is 
arguably a precursor to the Balkanisation of the Internet which is widely agreed to be a detrimental 
development.     
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Copyright Protection within the Audio Visual Media Services Directive 
As the audiovisual content industry is an important sector of the economy,
14
 copyright protection is needed if 
it is to continue its current growth.  It is suggested that a regulatory framework, which seeks to regulate 
audiovisual media in order for it to flourish, should have copyright close to its foundations.  There would 
appear to be little logic in not including copyright provisions within the overall regulatory framework, if only 
for “Better Regulation” purposes.15 
 However, the new the AVMS Directive, which provides the new regulatory framework for IPTV and 
traditional broadcasting, does not take this joined up approach.   The purpose of the Directive is to overhaul 
the regulatory framework for the European broadcasting industry.  This has been necessary primarily due to 
convergence bringing about the possibility to watch TV on-line.  The principal objective of the Directive is to 
create a modern but technologically-neutral framework which allows for traditional television functions to be 
taken over gradually by audiovisual media services.  The Directive can also be seen as part of the EU‟s wider 
i2010 initiative, seeking to increase growth and jobs in the information society and media industries by 
creating a regulatory environment that encourages investment and innovation.  Under the new framework, the 
essential nature of an “audiovisual media service” is that it is a service under the editorial responsibility of a 
media service provider which has the principal purpose of providing programmes in order to inform, entertain 
or educate the general public.  Such services will either be a “television broadcast” or an “on-demand 
service”.  This distinction determines which regulatory provisions apply to the service in question.  For 
present purposes it is important to note the definitions of “television broadcast” and “on-demand service” as 
provided by article 1.  The former is stated as being “an audiovisual media service provided by a provider for 
simultaneous viewing of programmes on the basis of a programme schedule”.  The latter is defined “as an 
audiovisual media service provided by a media service provider for the viewing of programmes at the moment 
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chosen by the user at his/her individual request on the basis of a catalogue of programmes selected by the 
media service provider”. 
Within the Directive, article 3c is the only provision that makes reference to the issue of copyright; 
even then this is in the limited scope of prohibiting service providers from transmitting cinematographic 
works outside the periods agreed with the rights holders.  Ironically, this is highlighted in a Parliamentary 
report
16
 (herein The Report) as something that encourages copyright infringement.  In recommendation 15 it 
“accept[s] the argument, in principle, that delaying universal access to film through the use of release 
windows, and holding back rights to broadcast television programming via new media, contributes to a 
climate in which piracy flourishes.”17 
There is a further indirect reference to copyright in the AVMS Directive through the provisions of 
chapter IIc which covers exclusive rights and short news provisions.  These provide that in the interests of 
media pluralism where an event has been acquired exclusively by one “broadcaster”, that broadcaster can be 
made to provide “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” access to other broadcasters for the purpose of 
short news reports.
18
   Compensation arrangements should be available under the Member States‟ legal 
systems for a breach of the access terms.
19
   
No other references to copyright are made in the framework,
20
  yet the long standing argument in 
favour of copyright protection is that without it, the same economic goals which the AVMS Directive seeks to 
achieve cannot be met.  There is arguably a contradiction here, particularly as no significant mention of 
copyright is made in the AVMS Directive; yet the technology that has allowed the present situation to evolve 
is being cited as a threat to the industry‟s very existence.  The EU may point to existing legislation that 
provides copyright protection as the reason for its omission here.  However, this assumes that existing 
copyright protection is suited to the new, dynamic audiovisual environment that the new framework was a 
response to.   
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Existing EU Copyright Protection  
The EU‟s Copyright Directive21 states that through a harmonised legal framework on copyright, not only will 
there be a higher level of protection, but also a fostering of “substantial investment in creativity and 
innovation … and lead to growth and increased competitiveness of European industry, both in the area of 
content provision….”.22  This suggests a close operation between this and the broadcasting framework; 
particularly as it goes on to state that intellectual property rights are “necessary” to ensure the availability of 
an attractive return on the “considerable” investment needed to produce on-demand services.23 
 The Copyright Directive provides, for present purposes, two key rights for content creators.  The first 
is in article 2, the reproduction right.  This gives Member States the ability to provide for certain creators the 
exclusive right to decide whether or not they allow any form of reproduction of their work.  For present 
purposes, the important group of creators that this right applies to is “broadcasting organisations”; it is also 
clear from the wording of the section that broadcasts transmitted over the internet were intended to be 
protected.
24
  
 The second right allows for the provision of an exclusive right to determine whether a work is 
communicated to, and made available to, the public.  This right includes whether to make the work available 
to the public in such a way that the work may be accessed “from a place and at a time individually chosen” by 
a member of the public, i.e. on-demand.
25
  The provision of an exclusive right to determine communication to 
the public applies to authors only.
26
  The right for making a work available to the public applies to the same 
groups as the reproduction right and so includes “broadcasting organisations”.   
 The result appears that copyright holders of audiovisual media content will have an exclusive right to 
determine whether their work is reproduced, communicated or made available to the public,
27
 and therefore, 
fills the gap within the AVMS Directive.  An individual is prohibited from copying content and then 
uploading it to a website for others to download, as this would involve the reproducing and making available 
9 
 
of that content.  It is suggested that this view is mistaken as it is only applicable to a confined range of 
audiovisual media situations.  The Copyright Directive contains no definitions as to what constitutes the 
groups of recognised right holders, most notably, “broadcasting organisation”.  At the time of the 
implementation of the Copyright Directive, the meaning of the term broadcasting may have been obvious, or 
it may have been logical to apply the definition within the old Television without Frontiers Directive which 
was in force at the time.  However, the concept of broadcasting is redefined by the AVMS Directive; in fact, 
the term “broadcasting organisation” is completed omitted from the AVMS Directive.28  Can it really be said 
that a Directive passed in 2001 can have the meaning of another Directive passed some six years later without 
the latter expressly stating that its terms are applicable?  It is suggested it cannot, otherwise there would never 
be any reason to pass amending legislation to modernise terms and provisions.  The issue that exists therefore 
is that, if content is watched and copied from a traditional, linear transmission there is protection.  The 
television broadcaster who transmitted the content would clearly be a recognised right holder.  Neither is there 
a problem where the content is transmitted by an on-demand service, as long as the person behind the 
transmission is a “broadcaster”, they should still fit within a “broadcasting organisation”.  The problem arises 
where the transmission is performed by a person who solely operates as an on-demand service provider.  The 
distinction made by the new framework between “on-demand service” and “television broadcasting”29 means 
an on-demand audiovisual media service provider cannot seriously be classed as a “broadcasting 
organisation”.  Therefore, an equivalent to YouTube who transmits content after having the rights assigned to 
it may have no copyright protection.  If the content is produced in-house, so that they are the “author”, they 
would have protection as the copying is a reproduction
30
 and the uploading of the content onto a website 
would constitute communication to the public.  However, any independently sourced work, the amount of 
which the AVMS Directive seeks to increase, again would fall outside the Copyright Directive.  The result, 
potentially, will be that these independent works are not commissioned, as the economic incentive to do so is 
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removed if they can be copied at will by the public.  This, in turn, hits media pluralism, another aim of the 
AVMS Directive.   
 This void in protection could, perhaps, be filled by technological means.  Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) technologies have been developed in recent years.  DRM technologies are used by copyright holders 
to act as access controls to content and limit the usage of digital media.  They have proved controversial as 
they can restrict content use in ways not prohibited by existing copyright laws, primarily fair use 
exemptions.
31
  They have also proved controversial due to software and platform interoperability issues; for 
example, the BBC‟s new on-demand demand service iplayer has generated complaints.32  Due to the DRM 
used, downloaded transmissions can only be kept for 30 days (7 days once watched).  This may not be such an 
issue for a free service such as iplayer, but it is hard to see the sustainability in a commercial model based 
along these lines.  People who pay for downloads are surely entitled to repeat usage, as with music mp3s, yet 
this is the approach largely taken by Channel 4.  The other complaint regarding the iplayer is that due to the 
DRM being jointly developed by Microsoft, the service is currently only operable on Windows XP.  Clearly, 
as a public service broadcaster this has to change and a more interoperable system is due for role out in the 
coming months.  However, this does then impact on the non-interoperability of other services.  There is little 
incentive to develop an innovative new service, such as a broadcast equivalent of iTunes, if, due to DRM 
technology within that content or content delivery platform, content cannot be viewed on certain devices 
needed to view the content.
33
  It is somewhat surprising that at a time when the music industry is moving 
away from DRM,
34
 broadcasters are implementing them for their on-demand services.  
DRM growth and attractiveness for rights holders has flowed from the legal backing the Copyright 
Directive gives them.
35
  Article 6 states that Member States shall provide “adequate legal protection against 
the circumvention” of DRM technologies.  Additional legal protection is to be offered against the 
“manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental…or possession for commercial purposes of devices, products 
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or components” which can be used to circumvent DRM technologies.  Even the promotion, advertisement or 
marketing of such devices is prohibited.  Further protection is given by article 7 which provides Member 
States to legally protect against the removal or alteration of the content‟s electronic rights management 
information, the information regarding who the rights holder is, and the terms of usage. 
Therefore, as things stand, an individual legitimately paying to download a transmission of a 
programme, and then stripping away the DRM technology in order to watch the programme again, or over a 
longer period, or to use a different viewing platform, is committing a crime.  In the UK, this could potentially 
lead to 2 years imprisonment and/or a fine
36
 for doing something which at its core level is a legitimate act.
37
  
Obviously, this is to act as a deterrent so that the stripped down content is then not made available to the 
public or distributed.  However, the unequal bargaining position of viewers when accepting
38
 that such an act 
will be copyright infringement, and thus criminal, lends weight to that the view this should not be criminal 
behaviour and should be allowed as a private use exemption.
39
                                                                                                                                                        
Ultimately, the fact that legislative regulation is in place is one thing, but it is common knowledge that 
copyright infringement through file sharing, or indeed, that solely for private individual consumption is 
widespread.  This raises question marks over the initial justifications of copyright; content production is still 
occurring after all.  In fact, if one includes non-commercial user generated content, on websites such as 
YouTube, it could be said to be thriving. Generally, the call is always for more robust protection and harsher 
penalties for infringement; as prosecutions arise the system can be said to be effective.  The question must be 
asked however, as to whether this really is the most appropriate approach.  Is there not a better way of giving 
protection without continually strengthening protection and increasing the deterrents?  While certainly 
beneficial to the copyright holders, it could be argued that such a move is not beneficial to society as a whole 
as it does not allow as much creativity as there could be.  Alternatively, we might instead adopt an approach 
that may allow for the easier distribution of audiovisual content, which could lead to enhanced cultural 
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development and knowledge, as well as providing inspiration for further innovation; such a scenario is after 
all, another aim of the AVMS Directive. 
 
Creative Commons:  A More Realistic Alternative? 
An approach such as that described above, has in fact been advocated by those behind the creative commons 
movement.  They believe that the current copyright protection regime actually hinders creativity – the 
opposite outcome for its justification.  Film Director Davis Guggenheim has explained that before he can 
shoot any scene for a film he must get “clear rights”, not just for the initial story or soundtrack, but also for 
incidental works such as billboards in the background or drinks that a character may be holding.
 40
  The 
creative idea must go through a process of scrutiny by lawyers to determine what rights may be infringed and 
then to gain permission for its incidental inclusion.  He goes on to cite various examples of litigation that have 
arisen from this situation.
41
   The result is a constraint on creative and editorial prerogative, as the makeup of a 
scene is determined by copyright holders.  Arguably, this is no different from the influence the AVMS 
Directive (and its predecessor the Television without Frontiers Directive) has sought to restrict through its 
advertising restrictions. 
 There are theoretical arguments to be made against the idea of a creative commons.  Chander and 
Sunder
42
 suggest that people celebrate the advent of the creative commons because of the belief that, as the 
resource is open to everyone, everyone will exploit it.  However, they argue that this is “naïve, idealistic and 
removed from reality.”43  They highlight that, even if a regulated market exists, there will not be equal 
distribution of the resource.  This would suggest that the possibility of greater access will not necessarily 
result in greater access for the masses.  There is certainly merit in this view on a general level, and it would 
also seem to tie into the theory of the “Tragedy of the Commons”,44 whereby resources, due to their public 
availability, are used to extinction or are left in ruin.  However, these arguments do not appear to relate to the 
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specific issue of broadcasting content where content is non-rivalrous.  This is perhaps where the debate over 
the widespread introduction of a creative commons becomes complex.  It may well be that such an approach 
is not suitable for certain industries; for other industries, the concept may need adaptation.  Perhaps the debate 
over the adoption of a creative commons needs to become more sector-specific; here, the focus is on the 
broadcasting industry.   Some film studios and television broadcasters vigorously resist the arguments in 
favour of such an approach.  The Creators‟ Rights Alliance has dismissed the idea as something that “would 
not work in certain types of industries” and just the product of academics “who do not understand the rest of 
the world.”45      
The debate is generally framed by opponents as one of maintaining protection or having none at all. 
However, the commons approach is about balancing the copyright system to maintain protection on the one 
hand, but also allowing the greater distribution of ideas.  The aim is to get the balance right between the 
degree of control that content is subject to,
46
 and the extent to which it is free.
47
  The proponents of a creative 
commons argue that such an approach can lead to greater creativity and innovation; particularly when 
compared to a system which attempts perfect control through divided up proprietary rights such as what we 
have now.  The various layers that make up traditional television
48
 (particularly cable and satellite) have been 
cited by Lessig as a system that is completely controlled, none are “free”.49  This can be contrasted with the 
Internet and its original end-to-end architecture
50
 which means the main layers are free.
51
  This can be 
illustrated by the vast user generated content that appears on sites such as YouTube: no station controller 
exists
52
 to decide what can be transmitted, consequently creativity flourishes and creators know there is a 
guaranteed outlet for their work.  Admittedly two points arise from this situation.  Firstly, someone making 
comedy clips in their bedroom could be said to not be on the same commercial level as a multi-million pound 
broadcasting corporation.  Such a person is not necessarily creating work for financial gain, merely for 
14 
 
creative expression and as such is not affected by copyright infringements of their work.  Secondly, it could 
be said that this lack of a body exercising editorial control encourages copyright infringement.
53
   
The result for traditional television broadcasts is, that the most important layer, content, is being 
restricted through the legislative provisions and technologies described above.  This leaves us with a situation 
that is “perfect control [but one] that threatens to undermine the potential for innovation that the Internet 
promises… [The] aim should be a system of sufficient control to give artists enough incentive to produce, 
while leaving free as much as we can for others to build upon and create.”54  The rationale for this view is 
because “[n]othing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and 
technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before.  
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it‟s supposed to nurture.”55  While copyright may increase the 
incentives to produce for creators, it also increases the costs of production, and thus, coupled with the threat of 
litigation, can act as a barrier to the creative process.  Therefore, it could in fact be said to go against its stated 
justifications. 
The commons approach operates by way of a licence system, based on copyright, which the creator of 
the work uses to attach to the work.  In total there are six licences, but these are non-exclusive so that a creator 
can subsequently sell their work under a licence allowing for the recipient to make commercial use of that 
work.  All of the commons licences allow file sharing provided it is not for monetary gain; if this is the 
purpose behind the sharing, the licence must not have a non-commercial use restriction attached.   
Additionally, the creator can decide whether they want derivative works to be produced from their original, 
although as noted the system is flexible enough to allow for a change of mind in subsequent cases.  If the 
work is passed on, the new recipient is bound by the same licence terms as the original recipient.  If the 
content in the above loophole scenario has a commons licence attached to it, then that work will be protected 
under copyright but the action would be legal and thus there is protection balanced with a greater level of 
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access.  Therefore, it is suggested that this system allows for increased access to material and thus allows 
creativity to flourish.  In turn, commercial use can be made of such work, and so financial incentives also 
exist as the potential commercial use of the work can be reflected in the amount claimed by the creator for 
distributing the work to the person who seeks to have possession of it.
56
   
 There are criticisms that can be levied at this argument.   A case can be made for arguing that people 
can simply circumvent payment for content use in much the same way as they do now with the copying of 
CDs.  However, this can be countered in that it shows it would be no different from the present system.  A 
commons approach will simply decriminalise an act that is in fact an everyday occurrence and in fact gained 
support in The Report.  Again, content is continuing to be produced, regardless of such current illegal activity, 
by removing the existing usage restrictions production could increase further as the fear of litigation is 
alleviated from other potential creative talents.
57
   This is not to say that wanton copying that is then 
distributed as an original piece of content should not remain prohibited.  Under a commons approach, the 
creator of the work has greater power to choose what a recipient can do; if they do not want a derivative work 
produced they can stipulate that. 
There may well be practical problems that would need to be overcome in relation to broadcasting.  As 
the above discussion of the issues faced by David Guggenheim illustrates, a television programme or film 
may have a whole myriad of component rights, even in just one scene.  The issue is whether these rights, if 
not already available under a creative commons licence, can be obtained if the end product, the show or film, 
is then able to be distributed freely.  The price for granting the use of a piece of music as the soundtrack may 
be based on the predicted exposure of the produced content.  If much wider distribution was to occur than 
expected, due to the end product be subject to a commons licence, the initial grant of the right to use the music 
may be undervalued.   This could potentially lead to a stifling of innovation as disputes take place over the use 
of such third party content or the use is simply refused.  Ultimately, therefore, the success of adopting a wide-
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scale commons approach is dependent on whether the potential for commercial incentives is convincing 
enough for the industry and the government who would not want to negatively hit the wider economy.  The 
British Phonographic Industry has not dismissed this idea, but believes that this issue will be determined by 
the market.
58
  The problem, in the view of British Music Rights, lies with those in the middle of the spectrum 
that seek to make a career out of their work but are not established enough to lose income from sales.  This is 
the fundamental point, despite the theoretical and practical arguments against a creative commons approach, 
the obstacle to an expansion of use is the concern as to the financial impact.  Opponents of a creative 
commons have led the debate by advocating that such an approach will result in a loss of income.  This is 
clearly a genuine concern (although perhaps more so for the music industry) that does need to be addressed.  
There must be commercial sustainability for a content producer who operates without any content control, and 
before they begin production they will need to believe sufficient revenue can be generated.  Research by 
Roger Clarke
59
 suggests this is possible.  In the first instance, there is the typical scenario of a 
consumer/viewer paying for a piece of content, either per content piece or general subscription.
60
  By allowing 
more widespread distribution of content without controls, a wider market can be generated for that content 
through increased awareness and interest.
61
  This can then be capitalised on by providing direct access to other 
content that the producer has created through a payment system.
62
  In this respect YouTube has been praised 
by the BBC as having content that, while being illegal, is “good promotional content for us.”63  Content 
producers also benefit from this model of deferred reciprocity in another way.  This is where, although 
initially their work may be copied or used in some way, they can reciprocate this action.  When producing 
new content a producer can use the work of others as inspiration or as a starting point, helping to reduce the 
production costs.  This course of action, or „wikinomics‟, as it has been termed, is in fact gaining growing 
commercial acceptance as a method of adding economic value to a business.
64
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 In addition to using widespread uncontrolled content for the purpose of driving subscription services, 
it can also be used to attract higher advertising premiums.  Allowing content to be more accessible, as noted, 
means that more people have the ability to watch that content.  If the product is good, more will want to watch 
that content as with any traditional television broadcast today.  Wider content viewing figures which the 
Internet brings can result in wider reach for advertisers, leading in turn to higher revenues from content 
owners.  Such an approach to monetising content has in fact been advocated by Jay Adelson, the Chief 
Executive of Digg.
65
  However, for this benefit to be realised the content must be of sufficient value to the 
viewer.  This is in fact the strategy being adopted by Channel 4, and has already been successfully adopted by 
Hulu, the joint project between NBC and News Corporation.  While the content in question may not have a 
commons licence it can be argued that it does lend support to the argument that a more expansive commons 
regime can be commercially viable.
66
  
Additionally, another significant benefit for content producers today comes from the fact that 
technology can be utilised alongside on-demand services to create a profile of the viewer.
67
  This means that 
advertising can be targeted at people who will be more receptive to those advertisements.  This is something 
of a holy grail for the marketing industry, particularly with the lower production costs that already exist for 
Internet advertising.  Therefore, content producers can charge a significant premium for the advertisements 
running on that content.  The real benefit of this is that the content does not in fact need to be of mass appeal, 
as the advertiser is getting an interested audience the likelihood of sales flowing from that particular group of 
viewers is increased.   
 Therefore, a commons approach would result in a twofold benefit for content producers.  They can 
obtain access to a wider range of material to use within their content productions or as a platform that their 
new work builds from.  If permission is already granted within the attached licence, production can start 
straight away and legal advice need not be sought, reducing production costs.  Additionally, a relaxation of 
18 
 
copyright controls can actually indirectly generate higher viewing figures or revenue by creating wider 
exposure from easier distribution amongst friends.  People may watch a recommended production on-line for 
free; if they enjoy it they are then likely to „tune in‟ to the next episode and/or buy the box set of the series – 
the latter being something they would not do if they have not previously seen the show for themselves.  These 
commercial benefits are in addition to the benefits to wider society that are gained by increased innovation 
and the greater access to those creations.   
 
Conclusion 
The proposed AVMS Directive has already been criticised in some quarters over its substantive provisions, in 
particular, the decision to distinguish between the forms in which audiovisual media content is transmitted.  
However, the failure of the AVMS Directive to deal with the issue of copyright in the new audiovisual age is 
arguably the more pressing concern.  By not addressing the issue, but then distinguishing between “television 
broadcasts” and “on-demand services”, a loophole has surely been created within the existing copyright 
protection regime.  If the traditional economic justifications for the current copyright protection regime 
remain valid, then the AVMS Directive is set to fail in its objective to have an innovative audiovisual media 
sector.  However, it is argued that the copyright framework, as well as the audiovisual media sector, would 
benefit from a wide scale adoption of a creative commons approach to copyright protection.  This could not 
only solve the aforementioned loophole, but also produce more creativity than the current regime due to the 
wider flexibility and access that such an approach would provide.  Whether this scenario will occur remains to 
be seen, but is unlikely while the creative industry players remain so unconvinced by the revenue potential. 
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